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INTRODUCTION 
This paper attempts to dissipate the cloud of mystery which hangs 
over the Peruvian Communist Party — the Shining Path of Mariategui 
— its goals, strategy, and tactics. It examines Sendero Luminoso (SL) vis 
à vis other Latin American insurgency movements, bearing in mind the 
volatile situation in Peru which is being further exacerbated by the 
dilapidated condition of the country's economy. A comparison is also 
made between the precepts of Abimael Guzman and those of Mao. Final-
ly, this paper attempts to arrive at a conclusion concerning the pro-
babilities of success of SL. 
The paper is divided into six sections, excluding the conclusion. 
Each section deals with a different aspect of Sendero. The first focuses 
on the political and economic situation within Peru. It is followed by sec-
tions on the seat of the rebellion, SL's ideology, and SL as a Latin 
American insurgency movement. The fifth and sixth sections analyze 
SL's conduct of the struggle and the use of terror by both SL and the 
military. 
It is the author's intent to show that Sendero is far from being the 
disorganized and haphazard group that it is made out to be. It is a highly 
ruthless and organized movement, with a sophisticated leadership of 
cadres. 
THE CONTEXT 
Insurgencies and counter-insurgencies are deeply rooted 
in individual cultures, in religious, racial and social dif-
ferences within individual nations or sub-national 
groups.1 
The uniqueness of each country's particular history, traditions, and 
ethnic mix and its relevance in the moulding of insurgency is readily ap-
parent in the case of SL in Peru. Peru is a Latin American country and, 
like most others in that region, it is a preponderantly urban nation, with 
67 percent of its population living in the urban centers of Lima, 
Ayacucho City, Arequipa, and Cuzco. Further, like most other South 
American countries, Peru is presently passing through a very precarious 
stage in its development because of a slumping international economy, 
high U.S. interest rates, and a mounting external debt with attendant in-
terest servicing ratios. Indeed, the deteriorating economic situation of 
Peru is among the most ominous obstacles which the country has to face 
in order to maintain its internal cohesion. 
Domestic problems also beset Peru's young democracy. President 
Alan Garcia must content with several impediments: political and 
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institutional corruption; a military branch which only just five years ago 
relinquished power, and may step forward, at any moment, to reclaim it; 
the effects of a crippling foreign debt and the consequent internationally 
dictated austerity program which is hurting many Peruvians, and has 
been a contributing factor in several mass demonstrations; and the nar-
cotraficante (drug dealer) problem, which is slowly corroding the institu-
tions of law and order. In addition, he must cope with the growing unrest 
at home over Peru's poor record on human rights. 
Peru's democracy was restored in 1980, when former President Fer-
nando Balaunde Terry was elected after twelve years of military rule. 
During the years of dictatorship, Peru was not characterized by gross in-
fringements on human rights. In fact, the military proved to be quite 
radical. In 1969, under General Valesco's rule, the government decreed a 
Land Reform Act which was "breathtaking in scope, [as] it left 1200 pro-
prietors who owned 60 percent of the best cultivable land with little more 
than government bonds."2 The land was given to its tillers.3 In great 
part, the dearth of insurgency activity during the 1970s was due to the 
military's radical rule; further, the decade would serve as an 'incubatory' 
period for a radical group which would later be publicly known as 'The 
Shining Path of Mariategui.' 
Not all went well under military rule, however. Peru had already 
begun to feel the crunch from skyrocketing energy costs and from a 
deteriorating international economic environment. This caused an inex-
orable erosion in the living standards of most Peruvians, not the least of 
which were the peasants in the peripheral areas of the country's 
economic hub. Further, it became increasingly apparent that the police 
and the judicial structure had become victims of the cancerous effects of 
drug money, as "many ... officials became wealthy during [this] period 
of general hardship."4 This had the effect of embedding disrespect and 
cynicism toward these two bulwarks of the democracy that was about to 
emerge. 
The presidential candidate of the Partido de Accion Popular (PAP), 
Balaunde was elected from a field of fifteen candidates. His election was 
due to promises of democratic progress and the revival of the nation, and 
he offered such things as the guarantee of free press and the legality of 
opposition parties. In the economic field, he promised to tackle inflation 
and to create "a host of long-range billion-dollar development projects 
intended to reverse the economic disintegration that had attended the 
final years of military rule."5 To accomplish this, he planned to shift 
Peru's predominantly state-owned and controlled economy into a free 
market economy. Unfortunately, these policies were implemented at a 
time when 'everything that could go wrong did.' Peru was hit not only by 
droughts but also by floods in the coastal regions. The latter were caused 
by the unseasonal warm currents in the Pacific known as 'El Nino.' 
These natural disasters were compounded by a world-wide recession, 
leading to a slump in exports, and by draconian austerity measures. 
Thus, both agricultural and industrial productivity fell. Peru's economy 
continued to deteriorate. 
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Another of Balaunde's first actions upon election was the annul-
ment of the Land Reform Act. This act undermined the confidence 
which many Peruvians had placed in the newly elected government. The 
final coup de grâce, in this slow erosion of confidence, came with the 
onslaught of the 'dirty war' against the guerrillas combined with the 
harsh austerity program implemented by the government. Presently, 
many commentators have observed, the government needs to be suc-
cessful in its campaign against Sendero Luminoso (SL)S in order to 
bolster its popularity once again. 
But even now, such a success could prove to be perilous for the 
government. The reason is quite simple. Fernando Balaunde Terry's first 
presidential term ended abruptly when the military, with the momentum 
gained in the eradication of a subversive movement, seized power in 
1968. Therefore, this time around Balaunde "has taken pains to keep the 
military content"7 within the government. He has authorized a scheduled 
3 billion dollar (U.S.) defense project, which includes the expenditure of 
870 million dollars (U.S.) on two dozen French Mirage aircraft and con-
tracts with the USSR, the United States, and Italy for a total of 28 
helicopters. The President's timidity vis à vis the military also accounts 
for the government's slow reaction to the SL threat, "[for] the first two 
years of Sendero Luminoso's existence, the government buried its head 
in the sand, since the incidents were confined to ... less than 5 percent of 
the territory."* Balaunde is credited by many with attempting to forestall 
the human rights abuses which generally accompany military counter-
insurgency operations, by the use of the civil guard. Unfortunately, they 
proved to be hopelessly ineffectual and indeed counterproductive. 
THE SEAT OF REBELLION 
In 1980 few Peruvians had ever heard of Sendero Luminoso. Even 
fewer paid any attention when the morning after the elections dead dogs 
appeared hanging from the utility poles down one of Lima's busiest 
boulevards. Many 'Limenos' figured it was a prankster's joke, but for 
the peasants up in the altos of the Andes the 'joke' had an ominous 
meaning. 
According to a popular legend dating back to the Incas, 
which Indians in the region who have never heard of 
Mao can easily recite, the dog is a companion who 
follows, or leads, his master to the grave. And so the 
peasants figured ... that wherever a hanging dog ap-
peared, someone was going to die, or be put to death.' 
Sendero Luminoso's blend of Incaic mysticism and an unique inter-
pretation of Marxism are the product of the environment in which SL's 
leader, Abimael Guzman, taught and studied insurgency. The Depart-
ment of Ayacucho is situated in the heights of the Andes mountains. 
Wretchedly poor and isolated, it has no industry or steady public 
works.10 Over half a million people lived there, in small hamlets hours 
away from the nearest roads, in localities so small they do not appear in 




reaches about 75 percent. Austerity for the Ayacuchans is a way of life, 
with their annual per capita income of about 60 dollars (U.S.), about 
one-tenth of the national average.12 Because of the neglect in which they 
live, the people are centuries behind in their development. The 
backwardness of the Andean populace, which is mainly Indian, had 
caused deep resentment and distrust of the urban Spanish speakers. This 
resentment has been exacerbated by the brutality of the government's 
counterinsurgency campaign.13 
Although in the last couple of months the struggle has spread to the 
lower-lying jungle, Ayacucho is Sendero's battleground, its power base. 
The poverty and widespread resentment has provided SL with its needed 
recruits, despite the violence in the new recruit scheme; recruits are re-
quired to execute those found guilty by 'people's trials.' Sendero takes 
full advantage of the centuries-old ethnic and economic resentment to 
appeal to the peasants. The Ayacucho Indians have a long history of 
revolt, and several of their "rebellions were messianic in nature, the 
peasants believing that a new Inca emperor, assisted by the old Andean 
gods, would lead them to victory in a war against their Spanish-speaking 
aggressors."14 SL has adopted this messianic attitude as a persuasive tool 
to enlist support, especially for disaffected young peasants who believe 
their ethnic oppression is as unbearable as their economic oppression, if 
not more so. For this reason, Sendero remains unique among Latin 
American insurgency movements. 
THE IDEOLOGY 
Sendero Luminoso was conceived almost twenty years ago, the pro-
duct of a young philosophy professor at the National University of 
Huamanga in the City of Ayacucho. Abimael Guzman was not only one 
of the most radical spokesmen for armed struggle during the turbulent 
sixties. He led a group of equally vociferous students and, most impor-
tantly, he literally controlled all levels of education, primary, secondary, 
and higher, in the Ayacucho City area. Children aged 4-12 were indoc-
trinated in Marxism and in Maoism at the Pedagogical Institute of 
Ayacucho. Those same students then finished their primary and secon-
dary education at the Colegio Guaman Poma de Ayala, which too was 
run by senderistas. From there they would go to the University where 
Guzman took them on.13 Dissidence was met with hostility and muted by 
fear. 
In his work Guerrilla Strategies, Gerard Chaliand has highlighted 
the importance, at the incipient stages of a revolutionary movement, of 
achieving "a correct understanding of the social situation one seeks to 
alter." Indeed, Abimael Guzman, or présidente Gonzalo, his nom de 
guerre which quite recently was changed from camarada Gonzalo, did 
just that. He began working for a peasant revolution, wanting to alter 
the existing structure which, in his view, oppressed the peasants. His 
views were shaped by Maoist theory, especially the Mao of the Cultural 
Revolution and the Gang of Four; he is also an admirer of Pol Pot, of 
Cambodia's Khmer Rouge, and his tactics. Indeed, Guzman became 
obsessed with Maoist thinking and dedicated to it. Beginning in the 60s, 
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he held political meetings in his home, drawing large crowds of 
students." He and his students saw a clear analogy between the China of 
the 1930s and the 'feudal' conditions of the Peruvian peasantry. This was 
the view espoused by the Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos Mariategui and 
his 1928 book Seven Essays for the Interpretation of the Peruvian Reali-
ty. Though Mariategui died before his ideal could be fully developed, 
briefly he believed "that largely rural Peru could achieve a revolution 
from the countryside to the city — the 'Yenan Way' that was later ob-
tained in Chairman Mao Zedong's China. Peruvian socialism, further-
more, would be a unique blend of Western technology and the ancient 
communal traditions of the Andean cultures."" Influenced by 
Mariategui, Abimael Guzman studiously developed his own Marxist in-
terpretation and set out to implement it. 
For this reason, his followers call him the fourth sword of Marxism 
(Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Guzman) and assert that he will lead a world 
revolution which is only now commencing in the Andes. SL's fanaticism 
and blind zeal are among its most salient characteristics. SL also shuns 
publicity and devoutly follows Guzman's highly schematic theories. It 
plans to follow Mao's dicta about a 'prolonged military struggle,' 'pea-
sant mobilization,' and the encirclement and final assault on the cities." 
Guzman is regarded by his followers as having rescued Marxism-
Leninism from the revisionist policies of the USSR, Albania, and, most 
importantly, China. For this reason, Sendero condemns all leftist Peru-
vian political parties as 'parliamentary cretins' and refuses to 
acknowledge them as Marxist. Because of its extremely sectarian nature, 
it is improbable that SL receives assistance from foreign or domestic 
sources, although it has been claimed, mostly by the government, that 
Sendero is financed by drug money, as the traffickers want the attention 
of law enforcement authorities diverted from their own activities. 
Doubtless, in forging his own views, Guzman was well acquainted 
with Hector Bejar's analysis, Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Ex-
perience, of the failures of Peru's insurgency movements in the 1960s. 
While in jail, Bejar primarily blamed ignorance of the peasants' language 
and customs for the failures of his group, as well as of other groups." It 
was in Hugo Blanco that Guzman must have found the correct way of 
guiding the revolution. Blanco had been successful in establishing a 
friendly rapport and mutual trust between himself and the peasants, by 
learning their language and their ways. "[He] was one of the few that 
began at the beginning," Leo Sauvage writes in his book about Che 
Guevara, "... he tried to be one of the peasants before thinking of 
himself as their leader."20 Blanco refused to treat the peasants as 
animalitos, small defenseless animals, whose behavior could solely be 
directed through the use of terror. 
Geoffrey Fairburn has opined that "peasant armies are peasant ar-
mies only in the sense that peasants make up a large part of the rank-and-
file,"21 and that people from the middle and high classes of society are 
the leaders of these armies. In contrast, Sendero's leadership composi-
tion seems to be mainly one of lower middle classes and peasants 
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themselves, although there have been reports of a few upper class cadres 
within SL's organizational structure. 
Between 1968 and 1970, before creating Sendero, Guzman broke 
with the Partido Comunista del Peru-Bandera Roja (PCP-BR). PCP-BR 
was a Maoist party which had split from the Frente de Liberacion Na-
tional in 1965. Guzman accused Bandera Roja of not practicing its com-
mitment to the armed struggle. He therefore decided to form his own 
party, 'The Peruvian Communist Party — The Shining Path of 
Mariategui' in 1970." His supporters began canvassing and distributing 
pamphlets in Ayacucho City; slowly his following grew. 
In 1971, he published and distributed a pamphlet which outlined his 
plan for the revolution. It stated that after nine years of preparation, a 
campaign of "limited struggle" would commence in 1980, with "diver-
sionary tactics" geared towards obtaining arms and recognition. In two 
years' time, Sendero would initiate its guerrilla war at the rural level and 
use sabotage tactics within the cities, to increase the urban feeling of 
isolation and siege. During 1984, the initial columns of Sendero's 'peo-
ple's army' would undertake in earnest the 'people's war.'23 SL has fur-
ther stated that it expects to wrest power from the government by 1990. 
Guzman retired from his teaching post in 1978 and vanished into 
rural Ayacucho. There, 
he organized his followers into cells of three persons 
each with military rank. Regional 'special affairs com-
mittees' coordinated the activities of the cells, and under 
the nom de guerre 'Comrade Gonzalo,' Guzman con-
trolled the entire organization." 
During the early seventies, Sendero recruits had begun fanning out into 
the Ayacucho region "to learn Quechua and highland customs and 
preach the good news of agrarian communism."25 Eventually, the SL 
members became the town school teachers, agricultural advisers, and 
peasant leaders. Currently, there seems to be anywhere between one 
thousand and three thousand active SL members and about the same 
number of supporters. 
It is interesting to note that Guzman's plans for the peasant struggle 
were advocated while the military was still in power and were set to take 
place under those circumstances. It appears it was sheer coincidence that 
the return to democracy was scheduled for the same year as that of the 
beginning of SL's struggle. In effect, such an occurrence facilitated the 
struggle of Guzman's followers, as a democratic government acts under 
more constraints than a military one. 
Sendero Luminoso is ultimately interested in a return to an Incaic 
agrarian society, through the ruthless methods used by the Khmer Rouge 
in Cambodia. "One gets the feeling that their attitude goes deeper than 
revulsion toward capitalism.... It's the tractor they can't stand."26 
SENDERO LUMINOSO AS A LATIN AMERICAN 
INSURGENCY MOVEMENT 
Sendero Luminoso is unique among Latin American guerrilla 
groups, in the sense that it does not follow or acknowledge the guerrilla 
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tactics posited by Che Guevara and the Cuban revolutionary example. 
Neither does SL follow the precepts of Carlos Marighella or any other 
Latin American urban guerrilla theorists. SL follows a distinctly Asian 
model of insurgency. 
Latin American movements and their tactics are the product of a 
rather unique set of circumstances. First, insurgency movements in the 
region have never had to fight foreign occupying powers in wars of na-
tional liberation; that is, most Latin American nations, with a few excep-
tions, have been and continue to be sovereign and independent countries. 
By and large, therefore, the guerrillas have had to fight the national 
governments, without being able to use the moral appeal of nationalist 
aspirations of the populace. 
Regis Debray was careful to point this out in his discussions about 
the Latin American guerrilla experience." Walter Laqueur, in more 
general terms, stated that the chances of success for a guerrilla movement 
are more immeasurably enhanced by the presence of a foreign power, 
however strong, than by a national government, however remiss.2' 
A second Latin American characteristic which has aided the growth 
of insurgency is the urban nature of the region. The guerrilla should arise 
and struggle wherever "the population suffices to form the army of the 
revolution."29 This is the principal reason why the focus of guerrilla 
movements shifted from the rural to the urban environment, especially 
during the sixties. Another major reason for this shift toward the urban 
environment is the stress which Soviet policy places on supporting urban-
worker Marxist parties, although Moscow does not openly advocate the 
use of terrorist tactics.10 It ought to be acknowledged that poverty in the 
rural areas has brought a mass of potentially disaffected people, especial-
ly young unemployed people, into the urban environs and thus made it a 
perfect niche for the spread of insurgent activity. 
With respect to most of these factors, Sendero is an uncommon 
movement. It stresses, at the rural level, the need for a war of 'Incaic na-
tional liberation' and the restoration of Incaic glory through an agrarian 
societal structure. This belief in the restoration of Incaic glory is based 
on the rusawilca myth. Rusawilca is a god-mountain "in whose belly a 
horseman with light skin and a white horse lives in a palace full of gold 
and fruit."21 It is believed this horseman will one day come to liberate the 
Incas (Indians) from the rule of the conquistadores. Sendero is, 
therefore, a uniquely Peruvian movement, for not many other Latin 
American countries can boast having largely undiluted Indian popula-
tions. Peru, in addition, has the problem of having vast segments of its 
territory which are virtually inaccessible and isolated, centuries behind in 
their development. 
Sendero's rural proclivities are the direct result of its doctrinal re-
quirements. All of Guzman's models of revolutionary warfare and of 
post-revolutionary reality are agrarian based. As a Latin American 
revolutionary, therefore, Guzman stands with Che Guevara. But, unlike 
Guevara, whose theory of the foco (mobile strategic base) as the 
vanguard of the party and the catalizing element of the revolution, and 
25 
Summer 1985 
who largely ignored the need for political proselytizing and organization 
before initiating armed struggle, Guzman has taken the necessary steps 
to insure the proper development of his insurgency organization, 
through nine years of political indoctrination and organizational 
development. Guzman, again unlike Guevara, is a firm believer in the 
protracted nature of the struggle and has not opted to expedite the 
revolutionary process by neglecting the importance of the political side 
of the conflict. 
Vast areas of the Ayacucho region are already under Sendero's con-
trol; it has established itself as the local authority. In this sense, Guzman 
seems to have heeded well the necessity for both a military and a political 
front in the struggle. 
SENDERO'S CONDUCT OF THE RURAL STRUGGLE 
Having seen how SL stands apart from other Latin American in-
surgency movements in its approach to guerrilla warfare, it is necessary 
now to focus on what its approach to this type of warfare might be. How 
much does SL embrace Mao's precepts and, conversely, how much does 
it differ from them? 
As foretold by Guzman, in 1982 Sendero intensified its people's 
war. There were daring actions taking place throughout that year, such 
as the raid on the Ayacucho prison in March 1982, which blacked out the 
city for several hours while a column of about a hundred senderistas 
freed all 297 inmates, most of whom were alleged SL members." 1982 
saw the beginning of a two-pronged approach as SL attempted to gain 
control of the countryside, by driving governmental authority out, and 
sought to discredit the government by prompting a draconian overrac-
tion to sabotage in the capital city of Lima. In most of its actions 
Sendero relied on dynamite, as it is relatively easy to obtain from Andean 
mines, and blowing up electricity pylons with dynamite has become a 
favorite tactic. 
This approach proved successful. In the countryside there was a rash 
of violent guerrilla activity, with SL claiming "responsibility for over 
3,000 guerrilla actions, including sabotage of power lines, bombings and 
burnings of police stations and municipal buildings, destruction of 
bridges ... and assassinations."" SL's aim was to lacerate communica-
tion between the cities and the countryside. Having achieved isolation, 
SL could begin its task of "reworking Peruvian society" by driving any 
and all vestiges of central authority from the region. Unsurprisingly, by 
the end of 1982 Sendero had been able to proclaim most of Ayacucho a 
'liberated zone.' 
In this respect, Guzman has followed Mao's dicta well. By encircling 
the cities, he is instituting plans to strangle them economically. Already 
SL has ordered peasants within its 'liberated zones' to produce only 
enough to feed themselves. It has forbidden trade of any sort, and has 
slaughtered cattle and ordered peasant markets shut, at gunpoint.34 In 
this area, Guzman and Mao diverge. Mao would have objected strongly 
to these latter tactics as they tend to intimidate, not to befriend, the 
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peasantry. These tactics have already caused rebellions amongst 
segments of the peasantry, and Sendero has had to resort to terror to 
quell such uprisings. By and large, however, the peasants have not had 
any choice in their indoctrination, "since they had no choice but to sup-
port, or at least coexist with, those who had assumed real power.'"3 
Sendero ended its push to liberate more zones by October 1982. In-
stead, it began establishing a 'legal order' dictated by Guzman in the 
villages and hamlets already under its control, proceeding to consolidate 
and organize these areas according to Sendero ideology, urging, for ex-
ample, self-sufficiency in agricultural production. In this manner, 
Sendero Luminoso has been able to create power bases within four years. 
SL does not travel through a village within a zone, it is always in the 
villages — in the person of the mayor, town council, or fellow worker.36 
Those entering the villages are the government forces who seldom can tell 
the difference between a guerrilla fighter and a simple peasant, though 
within the Ayacucho liberated zones, it is easy to disciminate between SL 
and government forces; "the government troops work from 8 to 8, 
Sendero keeps watch all night...."37 These power bases form an impor-
tant part of Mao's theory, as they provide sanctuary and respite for the 
insurgent forces. What China had in vastness of territory, Peru has in in-
accessibility. 
Sendero has also shown remarkable mobility. While the government 
troops focus their efforts in the Âyacucho region, SL spreads to other 
Departments, "bringing in a flurry of resignations by local officials."3' 
Its level of organization is also impressively developed, as shown by the 
case of one intermediate cadre, in one Department, knowing days in ad-
vance about 'public trials' taking place in another Department.3' Again, 
where Mao and Guzman differ sharply is in the reliance Guzman places 
on the use of terror to neutralize non-supporters and opponents. 
TERROR IN THE ANDES 
Sendero Luminoso is a terrorist revolutionary group. It uses terror 
as a tactic to coerce acquiescence from those who do not support it and 
to silence those who would otherwise oppose it. In Maoism, guerrilla 
organizations need the support of the people. Mao compares this to the 
fish, that is, the guerrillas, needing water to survive. Yet, in practice, it is 
not necessary for all the people to support or reject the guerrillas. In fact, 
"a large proportion of the people, usually a majority, have no wish to get 
involved and will conform to the dictates of either side if expressed by a 
man with a gun."40 
In other words, the aim of the guerrilla organization is to attract as 
many people as possible by a 'hearts and minds' campaign, thus gaining 
legitimacy from the people. It must also, of necessity, neutralize those 
who do not support it. The gravest danger lies with non-sympathizers 
who might inform the government about guerrilla activities and plans. It 
is not uncommon for guerrilla groups to neutralize or terrorize for 
dissuasive purposes, as one among several options to their avail. This is 
just what Sendero is doing. It uses terror as a tactic to further its 
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revolutionary cause. Therefore, it is not a terrorist group in the usual 
sense. Revolutionary groups use terror as a tactic, whereas terrorist 
groups use revolution as an excuse. Sendero Luminoso fits the first 
mould.41 The death toll in Peru has been increasing steadily since 1980. It 
is impossible to verify casualty reports since 1982, because the armed 
forces have imposed a veil of secrecy on its actions. According to 
estimates in the New York Times (July 26, 1983), approximately 1500 
deaths occurred before 1983. Another report in the NYT (August 18, 
1984) estimates almost 2700 deaths in 1983 alone, and a recent NYT arti-
cle (May 18, 1985) claims that as many as 6000 people have disappeared 
in the war between SL and the government. These estimates do not even 
take account of the 'common graves' being periodically uncovered in the 
Andes. 
These deaths are the result of the 'dirty war' in which the Peruvian 
government finds itself. It is precisely this kind of conflict which Presi-
dent Balaunde wanted to forestall and prevent. The main impediments to 
the successful implementation of the counterinsurgency campaign are the 
lack of resources for, and training and experience of, the Guardia Civil 
and the military.42 It seems most of the dead senderistas are those who 
the army had labelled as SL sympathizers. Also, many of the alleged 
desaparecidos (disappeared ones) are SL cadres who have been promoted 
within the organization and who, therefore, have to go underground in 
order to administer their added responsibilities.43 
Sendero Luminoso's use of terrorism is an exemplary model of ter-
rorism as a tool of insurgency movements à la Fairburn. In the beginn-
ing, SL cadres recruited by befriending and helping the peasantry; in a 
sense, stealing from the rich and giving to the poor. It eliminated the 
"enemies of the people" through "public trials." Once SL had the tacit 
or explicit support of the majority of the populace, its cadres stepped up 
their campaign of disruptive terrorism to, among other things, cause the 
overreaction of the government. "Some peasants claim that while [SL] 
kill[s] selected targets, government troops kill anybody who gets in the 
way."44 SL's aim is to consolidate its power in the countryside, by 
creating confusion among the peasantry about the 'good guys' and the 
'bad guys.'45 At that stage, SL begins to use coercive terrorism, attemp-
ting to "force obedience to the leadership of the revolutionary move-
ment."46 
In both cases [of disruptive and coercive terrorism] the 
revolutionary object is gradually to destroy direct com-
munication between the central government and the 
rural population, while at the same time establishing the 
revolutionary 'parallel hierarchies' of the counter-state 
as the real power in the countryside.47 
This is what has occurred in the Andes. The peasant population has been 
frightened into submission by both the government and SL. However, 
Sendero retains the upper hand, since, among other things, its terror is 
more discriminating than the military's: "If we kill, we kill having in-
vestigated those who are to die. We are not blind horses...."4' 
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The government has encouraged the peasants to resist Sendero's in-
cursions and movements, by offering food and supplies as bounties in ex-
change for captured, dead or alive, senderistas. At the same time, the 
government has neglected to offer protection to these very same peasants 
or to train them in methods of self-defense.49 In other words, the govern-
ment has left peasants, who choose to side with it, completely un-
protected and at the mercy of the brutal methods of SL. The results have 
been disastrous. In April 1983, 67 peasants who had collaborated with 
government forces were savagely massacred in Lucanamarca. Earlier, on 
January 26th, extreme nervousness and fear on the part of the peasants 
played a major role in the killing of eight visting journalists in the remote 
village of Uchuraccay. The inhabitants of the village thought the eight 
journalists were senderistas who had come to exact revenge for the killing 
of seven senderistas by the villagers two weeks before.50 
Consequently, peasants are being driven to abandon their land, 
without weapons, and to move to the nearest town or city. There, they 
form civil defense groups, with full knowledge that by doing so they are 
signing their own death warrants as far as the SL is concerned. Needless 
to say, these are the acts of desperate men, who have very little hope in 
the future and live in an anxiety-laden present.51 This latter condition 
results in what Douglas Pyke has described as the "collective condition 
equal to anxiety neurosis on an individual level." It is a quintessential ex-
ample of psychological terrorism, at work against those who oppose 
Sendero and its objectives. Caught in the cross-fire of terror, the 
peasants are being increasingly drawn to those they reckon will provide 
them with a greater degree of security, namely, Sendero Luminoso. 
CONCLUSION 
If Sendero has had such lucid guidance in its struggle thus far, how 
close is it to achieving its objectives? Not very close. True, SL has had 
great success in the countryside where its messianic message is easy for 
the Indians to understand. But Peru is a mostly urban country and, 
therefore, Sendero will have to modify successfully its message for the ci-
ty population. It is already doing so, but with far less progress than it has 
achieved using the countryside version. There are many potential recruits 
among Lima's disaffected young and among the residents of Pueblos 
Jovenes, the ghettos of poverty. They may be tempted to follow Abimael 
Guzman who acts according to what he preaches. Here the second im-
pediment to the ultimate triumph of SL emerges. Guzman has not been 
seen since 1978, although some reports state that he has been sighted. In 
either case, "he suffers from arthritis and a bad case of psoriasis, a skin 
disease associated with nerves that may be debilitating him."52 Sendero 
could turn out to be a movement without a leader, and one wonders if 
alternate leadership would provide the same foresighted course and deci-
sions? 
Much also depends on the way the government acts. Balaunde's 
presidency was perilously close to a coup. Senor Alan Garcia Perez, who 
was inaugurated July of this year, has his hands full, not only with 
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respect to the Sendero threat, but in regard to Peru's battered economy 
and massive foreign debt. Danger to Peru's democracy is low only so 
long as the people continue to have hope in President Garcia's youthful 
administration. If this hope is dashed and the Sendero violence con-
tinues, the military will be tempted to step in and deal more tenaciously 
with the country's unrest. Sendero must also prove that its guerrilla 
strategy works. Achievement of SL's goal of causing the collapse of the 
cities is tenuous at best, since such a strategy would entail broad popular 
discontent with the government combined with widespread terror." At 
present Sendero cannot count on either. Unfortunately, Peruvians can 
well count on Sendero's perseverance and more bloodshed. 
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